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An analysis of sovereign risk in South Africa with the 
focus on fi scal determinants
Z. Robinson
7A B S T R A C T
14This paper investigates the sovereign risk premium as an indicator of 
sovereign risk. An attempt was made to capture evidence that best 
explains bond yield spreads for the 21-year period after the inception 
of democracy in South Africa in 1994. Conventional unit root testing 
techniques were applied, and the results revealed unit roots at monthly, 
quarterly and annual frequency, warranting further econometric testing. 
The fi nancial crisis in the period 2007 to 2011 posed a potential signifi cant 
break in data and was built into the analysis. The results for the crisis 
period differed substantially from the pre- and post-crisis period and are 
reported as such. The results reveal a unique combination of explanatory 
factors (cointegration), but also a special implication for bond yield 
spreads. They re-affi rm the importance of fi scal policy decision making 
and fi scal balance, taking all factors into account such as long- and short-
term interest rates. Current spending and the public sector borrowing 
requirement have a statistically positive effect on spreads depending on 
whether they were pre- or post-crisis. The latter could be an indication of 
investor sensitivity, especially in terms of the way in which the borrowing 
requirement is utilised and the fact that capital formation is preferred 
to current spending. Furthermore, the maturity of domestic debt shows 
up as statistically negative, probably confi rming investor interest and 
thus confi dence in the long run, with possible consequences for fi nancial 
stability as a regional public good.
15Key words: policy, sovereign risk, spreads, bond markets 
1Since the democratisation of South Africa in 1994, the country has been exposed to 
an array of changes in the global financial arena. Global financial crises have adjusted 
the ‘playing field’, with the emphasis now falling and solidified on macroeconomic 
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policy. Bond yield spreads between emerging market and industrialised economies 
have adapted accordingly and opened a debate concerning the factors that best 
explain risk spreads.
This paper seeks to contribute to existing knowledge in the following ways: 
firstly, the study attempts to update empirical work that was done by the author 
in the past and investigates the determinants of sovereign risk with the sovereign 
risk premium as the dependent variable; secondly, the study tests time-series data on 
different frequencies, unlike other studies that tend to utilise only annual data, in 
some instances applicable to a panel of countries.
The paper is divided into four sections. The first section describes the sovereign 
risk premium and serves as a broad overview of existing studies. The second section 
proceeds with an analysis of real world changes or trends and concentrates more 
specifically on South Africa. The third section entails an empirical investigation 
that proposes a model for explaining sovereign risk (premium) in South Africa. The 
fourth section deals with the concluding remarks, including possible topics for future 
research.
Theoretical background: Existing literature
1Monetary policy and fiscal policy have become increasingly significant as the main 
drivers of global financial markets and the economy. Monetary policy, as set by the 
developed world, is still experimental. The main instruments of monetary policy have 
been quantitative easing (QE), although recently cancelled by the USA, and zero 
interest rates. Fiscal policy has been characterised by large deficits with major cuts 
in government spending and as such has become countercyclical. The intention of 
fiscal and monetary policy has been to restore the underlying economy to sustainable 
growth and stabilise financial markets. The irony is that both monetary policy and 
fiscal policy have raised systemic risks despite the opposite intention. The developed 
world’s government debt continues to rise, while monetary policy appears set at 
zero interest rates. Higher systemic risk in the developed world has made emerging 
market economies more attractive as investment destinations, although the austerity 
measures used by the developed world have become increasingly important as fiscal 
indicators to the potential investor.
So, what prompted the study initially? Although the answer is straightforward 
in that the sovereign risk premium in South Africa has changed substantially since 
1997, further clarification is required in order to answer the question.
In the current context, it is fitting to start with the factors that best explain the 
sovereign risk premium. Existing literature can be divided into a number of categories 
according to the results. Table 1 provides a summary of studies conducted in terms of 
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these categories and factors that best explain government bond yields and sovereign 
default risk spreads. Most of the studies are panel data studies applicable to emerging 
market economies. Classical sovereign default risk determinants are discussed, such 
as total indebtedness (debt/GDP ratio), debt service burden (debt/exports ratio or debt 
service-to-GDP ratio), level of hard currency reserves (reserves/import, or reserves/
GDP ratio), economic growth and so forth. An attempt has been made to report the 
most important studies, although these should by no means be regarded as the only 
findings. However, a discussion of the relationship between sovereign and corporate 
default risk is not included in this study. For a detailed explanation of the latter, refer 
to Peter and Grandes (2005).
As shown in Table 1, macroeconomic fundamentals, liquidity and solvency 
indicators specific to certain groups of countries could be regarded as the main 
stream of influence on bond yield spreads throughout history. Macroeconomic 
fundamentals include the following variables: GDP growth, inflation (monetary 
policy), external debt (solvency), level of economic development (including per capita 
income, level of crime and corruption) and default history. Liquidity is normally 
reflected by the size of the foreign currency reserves that countries keep, and lower 
debt levels are normally regarded as a good measure of solvency. A large volume of 
research exists on the relationship between yield spreads (interest rates) and levels of 
debt. The overwhelming result shows a positive relationship between yield spreads 
and government debt.
Monetary policy (including exchange rate) regimes could also play a role in 
determining the sovereign risk spread. An overvalued real exchange rate could 
increase sovereign spreads, with the magnitude increasing under a fixed exchange 
rate regime. However, the latter result reverses under a free-floating regime, leading 
to higher borrowing costs, especially during a crisis period. Fiscal policy variables 
such as government revenue and expenditure play a role to varying degrees. Evidence 
shows that current expenditure-based fiscal adjustments reduce sovereign spreads 
more than revenue-based ones.
Alternative explanatory factors, such as political risk (e.g. elections), are generally 
viewed as negative in terms of the pricing of sovereign bonds, and pre-election bond 
spreads are higher than post-election ones. Corruption translates into higher risk 
premiums and also relates to negative news events (including market sentiment) and 
the speed at which warning signals (e.g. equity prices and the ratio of broad money 
to gross international reserves) travel. Early-warning signals become significant in 
terms of sovereign debt crises through solvency and liquidity factors such as high 
levels of foreign debt relative to GDP, short-term debt relative to foreign reserves and
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Table 1: Existing studies explaining the sovereign risk premium
mdcclxxixCategories mdcclxxxPositive effect mdcclxxxiNegative effect
mdcclxxxiiMacroeconomic 
fundamentals (including 
solvency)
mdcclxxxiiiEdwards (1984; 1986)
mdcclxxxivBoehmer & Megginson 
(1990)
mdcclxxxvBayoumi (1995)
mdcclxxxviCline & Barnes (1997)
mdcclxxxviiMin (1998)
mdcclxxxviiiAlesina, Silvia, Roberto & 
Fabio (1999)
mdcclxxxixCatão & Sutton (2002)
mdccxcCatão & Kapur (2004)
mdccxciDetragiache & Spilimbergo 
(2001)
mdccxciiManasse, Roubini & 
Schimmelpfennig (2003)
mdccxciiiBernoth, Von Hagen & 
Schuknecht (2004)
mdccxcivAkitoby & Stratmann (2006)
mdccxcvKnoop (2013)
mdccxcviLiquidity mdccxcviiEdwards (1984)
mdccxcviiiCline & Barnes (1997)
mdccxcixMin (1998)
mdcccAkitoby & Stratmann 
(2006)
mdccciMonetary policy regimes mdccciiUribe (2002)
mdccciiiWang (2010)
mdcccivFiscal policy mdcccvAlesina, Silvia, Roberto & 
Fabio (1999)
mdcccviBernoth, Von Hagen & 
Schuknecht (2004)
mdcccviiAkitoby & Stratmann (2006)
mdcccviiiHauner & Kumar (2005)
mdcccixPolitical risk (elections) mdcccxJensen, Malesky & 
Weymouth (2014)
mdcccxiBlock & Vaaler (2004)
mdcccxiiCorruption (news) mdcccxiiiCiocchini, Durbin & Ng 
(2003)
mdcccxivContagion mdcccxvKaminsky & Schmukler 
(1999)
mdcccxviBeirne & Fratzscher (2013)
mdcccxviiMarket sentiment mdcccxviiiEichengreen & Mody 
(1998b)
mdcccxixCredit ratings mdcccxxKaminsky & Schmukler 
(2000)
mdcccxxiExternal factors mdcccxxiiArora & Cerisola (2001) mdcccxxiiiEichengreen & Mody 
(1998a)
mdcccxxivEichengreen & Mody 
(1998b)
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1debt service indicators (see Knedlik 2006). This is linked to contagion and increased 
financial globalisation (financial stability). These factors, in turn, have affected 
spreads and thus credit ratings, which are regarded as an indicator of a country’s 
ability and willingness to service its debts. Improved credit ratings could, however, 
also reduce the sovereign risk spread. Changes in a given country’s creditworthiness 
could thus affect the stock and bond markets of other countries, with a high 
correlation between sovereign spreads of crisis countries and thus contagion among 
different countries.
External factors (including global events) such as the world interest rate, terms of 
trade shocks and the stance and predictability of US monetary policy could also play 
a role in terms of sovereign pricing and thus country risk. The ‘herd-like mentality 
of irrational investors’ is also provided as one of the main drivers of sovereign 
spreads, largely because of the high costs of acquiring and processing information. 
Recent studies such as those of Wang (2010), Beirne and Fratzscher (2013), Knoop 
(2013) and Jensen et al. (2014) can be added to the analysis and shed further light 
on the factors that might influence sovereign risk spreads. The latter focused on 
the association between authoritarian rule, corporate governance and investment. 
Existing knowledge is vast, and the discussion has by no means been exhausted. 
Although a vast amount of literature exists on emerging market bond spreads, most 
are panel data studies. The base literature that needed to be explored for this article 
and further literature studies will be included in follow-up research by the author. 
The reader should be able to form an overview of possible factors that can have an 
influence on the sovereign risk premium.
The prevailing situation in South Africa
1The sovereign risk premium in South Africa has tightened substantially since 1997 
with one of the first sovereign bond issues. Although the investigation in this paper 
emphasises the factors that best explain the sovereign risk premium since 1997, it 
invariably includes the currency risk premium since 1994 as well.
The sovereign risk premium is measured as the yield differential between South 
African dollar-denominated debt and US dollar-denominated debt in the 10-year 
maturity range (SARB 2005: 35). The South African government’s 10-year bond yield 
decreased to 7.46% in November from 7.65% in October 2014. It averaged 10.24% from 
1997 until 2014, reaching a record low of 5.77% in May 2013. It rose rapidly during 
2008 to more than 10%, and this is accounted for in the analysis. In comparison, the 
US government’s 10-year bond yield decreased to 2.31% in November from 2.33% in 
October 2014. It averaged 6.37% from 1912 until 2014, reaching a record low of 1.40% 
in July 2012. The currency risk premium is measured as the differential between 
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South African government bond yields on Rand-denominated debt issued in the 
domestic market and dollar-denominated debt issued in the US market in the 10-to-
12-year maturity range (SARB 2005: 36).
Emerging market borrowers, whether private or public, normally pay a considerable 
risk premium over comparable risk-free assets (such as US treasury securities). The 
cost of local-currency-denominated debt will thus be equal to the risk-free rate plus 
the total risk premium (currency risk and sovereign or default risk premium).
In order to fully grasp the narrowing gap between bond yields up to 2013, an 
understanding of what determines or explains government bond yields is required. 
Nominal long-term yields have two components, namely the real yield and a measure 
of expected inflation. The former component is determined by the demand for credit 
and the balance of global savings and investment. The demand factors are the size 
of the government’s borrowing requirement and the demand for bond finance in the 
corporate sector. The supply of funds in international bond markets is determined by 
the following six main factors: the level of global savings; short-term interest rates; 
the expected risk-adjusted rate of return on alternative financial assets (including 
equities); inflation expectations; the pattern of demand by institutional investors; 
and expected changes in bond yields. For South Africa, one consequence of the 
supply of and demand for credit has been significant currency weakness. The Rand 
‘benefited’ from yield-seeking capital inflows, which distorted financial markets. The 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) also ‘benefited’ from these inflows by setting 
record highs, despite pressure on earnings. Interest rates have been cut to levels last 
seen in the 1970s, yet the economy has struggled to attain 2% growth.
Several factors could keep longer-dated bond yields at low levels: (1) emerging 
markets have been investing in hard-currency government bonds to build reserves 
(excess liquidity); (2) at a time when bond supply is slowing in many countries, there 
is greater liquidity; (3) more investors are trading in bonds (from excess savings), 
thereby reducing their prices; and (4) investors are more confident that future inflation 
will not erode returns unexpectedly because more central banks have credibility, thus 
reducing the risk premium required to hold longer-dated bonds (Llewellyn 2006). It 
is therefore realistic to conclude that South African bond yields correlate with global 
bond yields (especially US bond yields). Factors affecting global bond yields would 
therefore also affect the local market. The interrelationship between long-term bond 
yields and future inflation has been well documented in South Africa’s economic 
literature (see Abedian & Biggs 1998). Apart from liquidity, the possible drivers of 
risk spreads could include credit ratings of a country, the volume of debt (currency 
risk), external influences such as contagion, as well as technical features such as 
maturity of debt and duration (modified duration).
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By 2014, South Africa’s credit rating had been downgraded by all four rating 
agencies (Moody’s Investors Service, Fitch Ratings, Standard & Poor and Ratings 
& Investments). Sovereign ratings measure the risk of a country’s defaulting on its 
foreign currency debt service obligations. Determining factors in a rating include the 
ability of an economy to generate foreign currency, the magnitude of short-term debt, 
total debt stock and the level of international reserves, as well as the ratio of external 
debt to current account receipts.
The budget balance plays a determining role in terms of debt levels, but other 
factors such as economic stability, extraordinary receipts and payments, the absolute 
level of interest rates and exchange rates could also have an impact. Further factors 
such as improved economic growth and gross capital formation, increased tax revenue 
supported by a well-established tax collection system, favourable fiscal balances and 
public debt burdens have also added to the country’s positive ratings. Improved 
ratings in the past have led to lower debt service costs with more resources available 
for public service and infrastructure delivery. However, South Africa’s vulnerability 
is caused by a triple deficit. The Rand has weakened significantly. Easy inflows of 
foreign capital could quickly become outflows. This feeds back into the economy 
with higher prices and places pressure on households, which in turn places pressure 
on tax collections. Systemic risks in the developed world have become a real issue 
that has to be taken into account.
An empirical model to explain the sovereign risk premium
1This section focuses on the factors that best explain the sovereign risk premium. 
Sovereign risk is ultimately important for the potential investor, and from there the 
importance of fiscal variables and the influence of these variables on the sovereign 
risk premium and thus bond yield spreads. The discussion thus far suggests a 
theoretical model that underpins an empirical model similar to a typical portfolio 
model, which means that different risk premia need to be accounted for, in the 
following way (see Edwards 1984, for derivations):
                     (1)
1where S
t
 is the secondary market spread over the risk-free world interest rate in year 
t, X
K 
are the determinants of the default probability and b
K 
are the corresponding 
coefficients, therefore
  (2)
1where e
t 
is the disturbance term.
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The regression can be derived from the above two equations. Here an attempt 
is made to capture a combination of variables that best explains the sovereign risk 
premium in South Africa. Indicators of creditworthiness such as liquidity and 
solvency are included, but also macroeconomic fundamentals with separate policy 
(fiscal and monetary) variables. Policy measures can be adjusted in reaction to 
increasing spreads.
The following variables are considered determinants of the default probability and 
included in the X
t 
vector (monthly frequency): the yield on 10-year South African 
government bonds (BY); short-term interest rates such as the repo rate (ST_RATE); 
government revenue (LGOV_REV); government expenditure (LGOV_EXP); total 
debt and maturity (TOT_DEBT and MATURITY); the composite emerging 
markets bond spread (S_COMP); composite leading business cycle indicator 
(LCYCLE); foreign exchange reserves (LFOREX_RES); and a contagion dummy 
(CONTA_DUM). Most of the variables such as government revenue, government 
expenditure, total debt and gross domestic product are all in nominal terms.
A macro-finance model was also considered, namely the Bernanke-Reinhart-
Sack Model (Bernanke et al. 2005). This model explains the yield curve with 
five macroeconomic variables included (the federal funds rate, the deviation of 
employment from trend measured by an HP filter, the year-on-year percentage 
change in core personal consumption expenditures deflator, the Blue Chip survey of 
inflation expectations for the upcoming year, and the rate of the Eurodollar futures 
contract with four quarters to expiration). Although the model does not explain the 
sovereign risk spread per se and is not applicable to an emerging market economy, it 
could, with some modification, be utilised in the current context.
The model in this paper was also expanded for verification on an annual basis and 
various explanatory variables were added, for example, gross domestic product; gross 
capital formation; the domestic and foreign supply of bonds; the government deficit; 
short-term interest differences; and money supply growth differences between South 
Africa and the USA.
Equation 2 translates into the following basic equation, expressed as logarithms, 
where applicable:
1  
(3)
1Variables such as the inflation and interest rate differentials between South Africa 
and the USA were added, but without significant results.
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Data sources
1The empirical work investigates, among other things, the factors that best explain 
the sovereign risk premium in South Africa. It uses data that span the period 
December 1994 to December 2006, January 2006 to December 2011, and then until 
September 2014. The data set for the dependent variable comprises the stripped 
spread obtained from the Emerging Markets Bond Index Global (EMBI Plus and 
EMBI Global) for South Africa. The JP Morgan EMBI Global tracks total returns 
for traded external debt instruments in emerging markets issued by sovereign and 
quasi-sovereign entities, and is an expanded version of the JP Morgan EMBI Plus 
Index. The EMBI Global covers more eligible instruments than the EMBI Plus 
by somewhat relaxing the strict EMBI Plus limits on secondary market trading 
liquidity. It includes US-dollar-denominated Brady Bonds, loans and Eurobonds, 
which must have an outstanding face value of at least US$500 million (with maturity 
of more than two and a half years) and verifiable daily prices and cash flows. The 
EMBI Global is a market capitalisation weighted index with the country’s spread 
computed as the weighted average of the spreads of the included bonds. The bond 
spread is measured against a comparable US government bond.
Table 2: Summary of variables
mdcccxxvDependent variable 
mdcccxxviS_COMP mdcccxxviiEmerging markets bond spread
mdcccxxviiiExplanatory variables
mdcccxxixST_RATE mdcccxxxShort term rate interest rates 
mdcccxxxiGOV_REV mdcccxxxiiGovernment revenue
mdcccxxxiiiGOV_EXP mdcccxxxivGovernment expenditure
mdcccxxxvMATURITY mdcccxxxviMaturity of domestic government debt
mdcccxxxviiTOT_DEBT mdcccxxxviiiGovernment debt
mdcccxxxixFOREX mdcccxlForeign exchange reserves
mdcccxliGROSS_CAP_FORM mdcccxliiGross capital formation
mdcccxliiiNBR mdcccxlivNet borrowing requirement
mdcccxlvINT/EXPORT_EARN mdcccxlviInterest/Export earnings
mdcccxlvii(INFLATION_RATE mdcccxlviiiInfl ation rate (CPI)
mdcccxlixCUR_SPENDING/GDP mdccclCurrent spending/Gross domestic product
1The following time series were obtained from the SARB Quarterly Bulletin, namely 
the bond yield [BY] on 10-year government bonds; the net borrowing requirement 
[NBR]; the composite leading business cycle indicator [CYCLE]; current spending 
[CUR_SPEND]; foreign exchange reserves [LFOREX_RES]; government 
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revenue [GOV_REV]; government expenditure [GOV_EXP]; gross capital 
formation [GROSS_CAP_FORM]; inflation rate [INFL_RATE]; maturity of 
domestic government debt [MATURITY]; and government debt [TOT_DEBT]. 
The interest to export earnings ratio [INT_EXP] and short-term interest rates 
[ST_RATE] were obtained from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). A summary of all the important variables are 
provided in Table 2 for clarification.
Empirical results
1Tables 4 and 5 present the empirical results with different combinations of variables 
included, as indicated in equation 3. The latter is done to control for possible 
collinearity, among other factors. Before the determination of regressions, it is 
imperative to first check the order of integration of the different variables. Several 
methods are suggested in the literature for testing unit roots in time series. The 
augmented Dickey-Fuller (Dickey & Fuller 1979) or ADF test was used. To test for 
unit roots at various frequencies, equation 4 is estimated using the ordinary least 
squares method:
 
(4)
1Equation 4 is the augmented Dickey-Fuller auxiliary regression for a zero frequency 
unit root. In order to render the residuals from this equation, white noise, lagged 
ty ,8 , is incorporated on the right-hand side. The estimated coefficients of this 
model facilitate testing for seasonal unit roots by examining the significance of the 
parameter )1........3,2,1( ii , where T is the deterministic time trend, tsD ,  is the 
orthogonolised seasonal dummy variable, and t  is the error term. A variable Xt is 
considered unit-root non-stationary if the hypothesis that Xt has a unit root is not 
rejected by the ADF test. Table 3 shows the test results for determining whether the 
variables have a unit root. No trend or intercept was used in the test equation. All 
variables are included as proxy estimation for the regressions.
1
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Table 3: ADF test for unit roots in variables
mdcccliVariable mdcccliiADF test statistic mdcccliii5% critical value
mdccclivOrder of 
integration, I(d)
mdccclvLS mdccclvi-0.704 mdccclvii-1.943
mdccclviiiD(LS) mdccclix-12,441 mdccclx-1.943 mdccclxiI(1)
mdccclxiiBY mdccclxiii-1.182 mdccclxiv-1.943
mdccclxvD(BY) mdccclxvi-9.636 mdccclxvii-1.943 mdccclxviiiI(1)
mdccclxixST_RATE mdccclxx-1.348 mdccclxxi-1.943 
mdccclxxiiD(ST_RATE) mdccclxxiii-9.364 mdccclxxiv-1.943 mdccclxxvI(1)
mdccclxxviLGOV_REV mdccclxxvii10.635 mdccclxxviii-1.943
mdccclxxixD(LGOV_REV) mdccclxxx-1.716 mdccclxxxi-1.943 (-1.615)* mdccclxxxiiI(1)
mdccclxxxiiiLGOV_EXP mdccclxxxiv11.194 mdccclxxxv-1.943
mdccclxxxviD(LGOV_EXP) mdccclxxxvii-2.358 mdccclxxxviii-1.943 mdccclxxxixI(1)
mdcccxcLMATURITY mdcccxci-1.456 mdcccxcii-1.943
mdcccxciiiD(LMATURITY) mdcccxciv-14.347 mdcccxcv-1.943 mdcccxcviI(1)
mdcccxcviiLTOT_DEBT mdcccxcviii 5.434 mdcccxcix-1.943
mcmD(LTOT_DEBT) mcmi -5.647 mcmii-1.943 mcmiiiI(1)
mcmivLS_COMP mcmv-1.230 mcmvi-1.943
mcmviiD(LS_COMP) mcmviii-13.221 mcmix-1.943 mcmxI(1)
mcmxiCYCLE mcmxii 0.731 mcmxiii-1.943
mcmxivD(LCYCLE) mcmxv-5.383 mcmxvi-1.943 mcmxviiI(1)
mcmxviiiLFOREX_RES mcmxix-1.998 mcmxx-1.943 mcmxxiI(0)
1Notes:  The Schwartz information criterion (SIC) was used to automatically select the number of lags in the 
test equation. The sample period was from January 1994 to December 2006. L = logarithms and D = 
fi rst-level differences. * Signifi cant at 10% critical value.
1The results show that all the variables are integrations of order one, I(1), although 
the composite leading business cycle indicator was treated as exogenous. The 
conventional unit root-testing techniques such as the ADF and Phillips Perron tests 
do not always account for seasonality in data. The test equation ultimately includes 
the intercept, seasonal dummies and the trend to verify results. Considering the 
volatility (including sensitivity) of monthly data and the difficulty in mapping 
financial market movements into real activity, the final long-run equations are also 
based on theoretical inference. It is necessary to test for cointegration of the variables 
because the data are non-stationary. Multi-cointegration was found to be irrelevant. 
Research has shown that some economic variables expressed in nominal terms such 
as money, prices, wages and some stock variables may be better characterised as I(2) 
series (Engsted, Gonzalo & Haldrup 1997).
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Table 4: : Cointegrating vectors
mcmxxiiSample: January 1994 to December 2006, and January 2007 to December 2013 (although not 
reported)
mcmxxiiiIncluded observations: 126 after adjustments
mcmxxivTrend assumption: Linear deterministic trend in the data
mcmxxvSeries: S BY ST_RATE GOV_EXP TOT_REV MATURITY TOT_DEBT S_COMP
mcmxxviExogenous series: LFOREX_RES CYCLE CONTA_DUM
mcmxxviiLags interval (in fi rst differences): 1 to 6
mcmxxviiiHypothesis
mcmxxixNo. of CE(s)
mcmxxxEigenvalue mcmxxxiLikelihood ratio mcmxxxii5% critical 
value
mcmxxxiiiProb.**
mcmxxxivNone * mcmxxxv 0.424353 mcmxxxvi 69.58484 mcmxxxvii 46.23142 mcmxxxviii 0.0000
mcmxxxixAt most 1 * mcmxl 0.331298 mcmxli 50.70457 mcmxlii 40.07757 mcmxliii 0.0022
mcmxlivAt most 2 * mcmxlv 0.255926 mcmxlvi 37.24748 mcmxlvii 33.87687 mcmxlviii 0.0190
mcmxlixAt most 3 * mcml 0.240750 mcmli 34.70343 mcmlii 27.58434 mcmliii 0.0051
mcmlivAt most 4 * mcmlv 0.186723 mcmlvi 26.04215 mcmlvii 21.13162 mcmlviii 0.0094
mcmlixAt most 5 * mcmlx 0.122937 mcmlxi 16.52821 mcmlxii 14.26460 mcmlxiii 0.0216
mcmlxivAt most 6 * mcmlxv 0.076843 mcmlxvi 10.07439 mcmlxvii 3.841466 mcmlxviii 0.0015
1 *(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level
1The Johansen cointegration test was utilised to determine the number of 
cointegrating equations (CEs) in the system (S BY ST_RATE GOV_EXP TOT_
REV MATURITY TOT_DEBT S_COMP FOREX_RES CONTA_DUM 
CYCLE). Lag length criteria indicate that eight lags in the VAR render the residuals 
white noise, although studies show that the lag length can range between four and 
eight lags, hence the choice of six lags. The trace and maximum eigenvalue statistics 
indicate seven cointegrating equations (Table 4).
Contagion could have played a role, and a dummy variable (CONTA_DUM, 
1997:12-1999:01=1; 2000:04-2002:03=1 and 2008) was used to capture these effects, 
chosen according to the analysis by Pretorius and De Beer (2003). The dummy 
accounts for the crisis period in Zimbabwe from December 1997 to January 1999, and 
a further proliferation of circumstances before and after the Zimbabwean elections in 
June 2000. Further events such as September 11, 2001 (9/11) caused financial market 
turmoil, and the financial crisis of 2007 to 2011 had to be discounted. The contagion 
dummy was included as an exogenous variable to the system.
A vector error correction model (VECM) is specified and estimated if the variables 
are non-stationary and cointegrated. The error correction terms (ECT) are included 
in the model in order to capture the short-run deviations of the series from the long-
run equilibrium path (see Table 5 for the different cointegrating equations):
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 (5)
1where Z
t 
represents the error correction term for the determinants, and γ is the speed 
of adjustment, that is, how the variable S
t 
changes in response to disequilibrium. As 
mentioned, the ECM equation (5) contains both dynamic short-run changes and 
long-run adjustment processes for the determinants of the sovereign risk spread.
The seven cointegrating equations are as follows:
γ1Zt-1 = ln_S_COMP t-1 + 0.016 + 0.159ln_S t-1
 (0.846) (6)
γ2Zt-1 = BY t-1 + 0.109 + 3.316ln_S t-1
 (2.426) (7)
γ3Zt-1 = ST_RATE t-1 + 0.0215 – 3.133ln_S t-1
 (-2.438) (8)
γ4Zt-1 = ln_GOV_EXP t-1 – 0.004+0.065ln_S t-1
 (2.782) (9)
γ5Zt-1 = ln_TOT_REVt-1 – 0.004+0.024ln_S t-1
 (0.956) (10)
γ6Zt-1 = ln_MATt-1 + 0.001 – 0.144ln_S t-1
 (-3.192) (11)
γ7Zt-1 = ln_TOT_DEBTt-1 – 0.002 + 0.023ln_S t-1
 (2.463) (12)
1Table 5 represents the cointegrating relationships found in the system and reports 
the estimations based on equations 6 to 12.
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1The seven error correction coefficients, namely g
7
Z
t
,
 
are statistically significant 
at a 5% level (Table 5). These equations need further explanation, and from the 
results it is evident that any deviation of the estimated error correction terms from 
their equilibrium path will be restored at the following rates per month: (1) for the 
emerging markets bond spread equation at 208.8%; (2) for the bond yield equation 
at 87.7%; (3) for the short-term rate equation at 45.1%; (4) for the government 
expenditure equation at 377.4%; (5) against 564.3% for the government revenue 
equation; (6) for the debt maturity equation at 90.5%; and (7) for the government 
debt equation at 116.1%. Reverse causality could arise when governments change 
their fiscal policy in response to changes in spreads (Akitoby & Stratmann 2006), 
and Granger multivariate causality could become a reality in the long run in South 
Africa.
The emerging markets bond spread equation (DS_COMPt) and the fiscal policy-
related equations such as the (DGOV_EXPt), (DTOT_REVt) and (DTOT_DEBTt) 
explain most of the variation in sovereign spreads, namely about 80%, 97%, 98% 
and 79%, respectively. The emerging markets bond spread (DS_COMPt) relates 
to the importance of the global environment in which South Africa operates. The 
government expenditure, government revenue and government debt equations 
(DGOV_EXPt, DTOT_REVt and DTOT_DEBTt) deliver the expected signs, 
showing that an increase in these variables leads to a larger sovereign risk spread. 
The results tie in with those of Nyamongo, Sichei and Schoeman (2007) and the 
so-called “fiscal synchronisation hypothesis” that is rejected in the short run and 
confirm the fact that expenditure decisions are made in isolation from revenue 
decisions. The latter suggests that should government expenditure explode relative 
to government revenue on a month-to-month basis, higher levels of exposure to 
potential budget deficits are a reality. However, evidence of fiscal synchronisation in 
the long run implies that government expenditure and government revenue decisions 
are not made in isolation and the fiscal authority is in full control of the principal 
instruments of fiscal policy. Furthermore, the maturity of domestic debt shows up 
as statistically negative, probably confirming investor interest and thus confidence in 
the long run, with consequences for financial stability as a regional public good. The 
latter also confirms prudent debt management in South Africa, reducing the default 
risk over the longer run (CREFSA 1997; Abedian & Biggs 1998).
The bond yield equation (DBYt) and short-term rate equation (DST_RATEt) 
deliver similar signs and confirm the results on the sovereign risk spread. However, 
the results confirm the importance of fiscal policy decision-making and the fact that 
a fiscal balance could signal a smaller sovereign risk spread, taking all the other 
factors into account. The sovereign risk spread mainly moves as a result of the latter 
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factors, but also the remaining factors, namely the long-term bond yield (DBYt) and 
short-term rates such as the repurchase rate (DST_RATEt). Contrary to the norm, 
the exogenous variables such as the contagion dummy, the leading business cycle 
indicator and foreign exchange reserves (liquidity indicator) are mostly insignificant.
The data were run again for 1998 to 2014, but with an estimated vector auto 
regression (VAR). All the expected signs were the same for the fiscal variables with 
the exception of government revenue, which turned up negative. This variable is 
negatively correlated with the sovereign spread (EMBI Plus), that is, if the spread 
widens, less revenue is accumulated, which makes economic sense. The crisis 
period from 2007 to 2011 differed substantially from the pre- and post-crisis period. 
Government debt is positively related to the sovereign spread, that is, if the spread 
widens, government debt increases. Foreign exchange and interest expenditure of 
government are the same, that is, they are positively related to the sovereign spread. 
The rest of the variables such as the bank rate and the bond yield are negatively 
related to the sovereign spread. The post-crisis period (2011–2014) also differed. The 
foreign exchange and interest expenditure of government became negatively related 
to the sovereign spread, whereas government revenue became positively related to the 
sovereign spread.
As a robustness check of the results, alternative specifications were used, and the 
model was estimated with alternative measures of solvency and liquidity. However, 
no real significance emerged. To further check the above-mentioned results, the 
model was extended to annual data frequency from 1994 to 2014 using the Engle and 
Yoo (1991) three-step approach. The long-run equilibrium equation was therefore 
followed by the estimation of an error correction model (ECM) to capture the 
short-run effects. The last step was to use the ECM to estimate the final long-run 
equilibrium equation.
The estimated long-run model and the calculated t-values are summarised in 
Table 6. Economic evaluation of the relationship indicates that the variables, with 
some exceptions, have the expected sign and are statistically significant at the 5% 
level.
A similar exercise to that in Table 6 was done in terms of currency risk spreads, 
but was not reported because of the emphasis on sovereign risk spreads. The currency 
risk premium was also included as a driver of the sovereign risk spread, but with no 
significant results. The results reported in Table 6 confirm the importance of the 
fiscal variables, although a one percentage point increase in the inflation rate could 
lead to about 0.19% increase in spreads. The latter is also confirmed by the bond 
yield, which could serve as an indicator of inflation expectations.
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Table 6:  The Engle and Yoo (1991) long-run equation – Dependent variable: Sovereign risk 
spread (DS)
mmcxxxviExplanatory variable mmcxxxviiCoeffi cient mmcxxxviiiStandard error mmcxxxixt-ratio
mmcxl D(BY) mmcxli0.425653 mmcxlii0.103373 mmcxliii4.12*
mmcxlivD(CUR_SPEND/GDP) mmcxlv0.282269 mmcxlvi0.122724 mmcxlvii2.30*
mmcxlviiiD(GROSS_CAP_FORM) mmcxlix-5.218158 mmcl1.648851 mmcli-3.16*
mmcliiD(NBR) mmcliii0.473149 mmcliv0.231234 mmclv2.05*
mmclviD(INT/EXPORT_EARN) mmclvii-0.397561 mmclviii0.132599 mmclix-2.99*
mmclxD(INFLATION_RATE) mmclxi0.194053 mmclxii0.051432 mmclxiii3.78*
mmclxivLOG(FOREX_RES) mmclxv0.685245 mmclxvi0.209329 mmclxvii3.27*
mmclxviiiCONTA_DUM mmclxix-1.143177 mmclxx0.371857 mmclxxi-3.07*
1* Signifi cant at the 5% level
1Although, in some instances, the signs delivered unexpected outcomes, such as 
the liquidity indicator (total foreign exchange reserves), the results do confirm the 
importance of liquidity in investors’ decisions. Current spending and the public 
sector borrowing requirement have a statistically positive effect on spreads. The latter 
could be an indication of investor sensitivity, especially in terms of the way in which 
the borrowing requirement is utilised and the fact that capital spending is preferred 
to short-term current spending. According to Akitoby and Stratmann (2006), “there 
are reasons to believe that the financial market’s treatment of spending and revenue 
decisions would be influenced by the initial conditions of fiscal and debt variables”. 
The time series utilised in this study are different for an emerging market, hence 
the unique findings.
Policy implications and concluding remarks
1This paper explored the determinants of the sovereign risk premium in South 
Africa. The results reveal a unique combination of explanatory factors with definite 
implications for bond yield spreads. Cointegration analysis and error correction 
modelling were employed, and the results confirm the importance of fiscal policy 
decision-making and fiscal balance, taking all factors into account, such as long- and 
short-term interest rates. Although government expenditure, government revenue 
and government debt delivered the expected signs, indicating that an increase in 
these variables could lead to a widening sovereign risk spread, the results are further 
expanded and verified on an annual basis. Current spending and the public sector 
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borrowing requirement have a statistically positive effect on spreads. The latter 
could be an indication of investor sensitivity, especially in terms of the way in which 
the borrowing requirement is utilised and the fact that capital spending is preferred 
to short-term current spending. Furthermore, the maturity of domestic debt shows 
up as statistically negative, probably confirming investor confidence over the long 
term.
The main findings of the paper seem to acknowledge the importance of fiscal 
policy and the vulnerability (sensitivity) of investors to policy changes. The study 
suggests policy implications, especially regarding the attraction of foreign portfolio 
investment. Firstly, macroeconomic stabilisation (including sound policy measures) 
through prudent debt management takes precedence over and above foreign exchange 
reserve management. Secondly, capital formation and the delivery of quality services 
for business seem to be essential to potential investors.
The financial crisis in the period 2007 to 2011 posed a potential significant break 
in data and was built into the analysis. The results were run again for 1998 to 2014. 
The crisis period differed substantially, as did the post-crisis period, and both are 
reported. It could be argued that the sovereign risk determinants are important for 
financial stability as a regional public good in southern Africa as a whole to ensure 
its attractiveness as an investment destination. However, further exploration of the 
research findings is essential.
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